Abstract-Image steganography aims to securely embed secret information into cover images. Until now, adaptive embedding algorithms such as S-UNIWARD or Mi-POD, are among the most secure and most used methods for image steganography. With the arrival of deep learning and more specifically the Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN), new techniques have appeared. Among these techniques, there is the 3 player game approaches, where three networks compete against each other.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his paper, Simmons [3] formalised the reasoning framework for the steganography/steganalysis domain. It is defined as a 3 player game. The steganographs, usually named Alice and Bob, want to exchange a message without being suspected by third-party. They need to create a secret communication channel in order to converse secretly. So, they use a banal medium, for example, an image, and dissimulate in this medium a message. The steganalyst, usually named Eve, is observing the exchanges between Alice and Bob. If these exchanges are images, Eve has to check if they are natural (cover images) or if they hide a message (stego images).
In the passive scenario, Eve does not modify the images [3] ; the role of Eve is only to make a binary decision, i.e. a twoclass classification. Usually, in laboratory conditions [4] , Eve has to be clairvoyant, meaning that she knows or has a good estimation of all the public parameters used by Alice and Bob, but she does not know their private parameters. These hypotheses about Eve's knowledge are close to the Kerckhoffs' principles [5] used in cryptography and are interesting when one wants to evaluate or compare the empirical security of steganographic embedding algorithms of the literature.
Modern embedding algorithms are adaptive, meaning that they take into account the content of the hosting medium (the cover) in order to better hide the message [6] , [7] , [8] . Even if modern embedding approaches are the result of almost 20 years of research using codes and adaptivity, from a game theory point of view, these algorithms are qualified as naive adaptive steganography [9] , [10] . Indeed, when creating an embedding algorithm, the evolution of Eve's steganalysis strategy is not taken into account. It is more interesting to propose an optimal adaptive steganography [10] , also called strategic adaptive steganography. With such a steganography algorithm, pixels that would not have been modified by a naive approach have a chance to be modified. In other words, in a strategic adaptive steganography, the pixels' modification probability is set to ensure the Nash equilibrium in the catand-mouse game between Alice/Bob and Eve.
The strategic adaptive steganography is a very nice concept, but trying to formalize it mathematically often requires simplifying assumptions which are far from modelling the practical reality. Another way to obtain a Nash equilibrium is to "simulate" the game. Alice can play the game alone (from her side and without interacting with Bob or Eve) by using three algorithms: the embedding algorithm, the extracting algorithm, and the steganalysis algorithm, which are competing against each other. We will name those algorithms agents; and more precisely we will name Agent-Alice the embedding algorithm, Agent-Bob the extracting algorithm, and Agent-Eve the steganalysis algorithm, thus making a distinction with the Humans' users Alice (sender), Bob (receiver), and Eve (woman-in-the-middle). Once, an equilibrium is achieved, Alice keeps her strategic adaptive embedding algorithm (AgentAlice), and can send the extracting algorithm (Agent-Bob), or any equivalent information to Bob 1 . In reference to the Simmons' formalization [3] and the computer science point of view (algorithms notion), we thus decided to name the approaches relying on three agents, the 3 player game approaches. The reader should nevertheless be aware that from a game theory point of view there are only two teams that are competing (Alice plus Bob from one side, and Eve from the other side) in a zero-sum game. We believe that the "3 player game" naming better highlights the difference with the other families relying on adversarial approaches [11] .
In the steganography area, the pioneer approaches in order to find a strategic equilibrium dates from 2011 and 2012, and were proposed in MOD [12] and in ASO [13] algorithms. Each of these two embedding-approaches iterates until a stopping criterion is reached between i) the embedding cost map update by Alice while requesting an Oracle (this is equivalent to an adversarial attack against a discriminant), and ii) the Oracle's update (update of the discriminant).
In 2016, the authors of [14] proposed a cryptographic toy example: an encryption algorithm using three Neural Networks. The use of Neural Networks facilitates obtaining a strategic equilibrium since the problem is expressed as a minmax problem. Moreover, its optimisation could be completed through the well-known back-propagation optimisation process. Naturally, this 3 player game concept can be transposed in the steganography domain using deep learning.
In December 2017 [1] , and September 2018 [2] , two different teams from the machine learning community proposed, in NIPS 2017 and in ECCV 2018, to define strategic embedding, using 3 CNNs, iteratively updated, and playing the roles of the Agent-Alice, Agent-Bob, and Agent-Eve. Those two papers fly over the 3 player game concept, but the security notions and their evaluation are not treated correctly. When Eve is clairvoyant, these two approaches are, in reality, very detectable.
More generally, the 3 player game approach belongs to one of the four GAN families, used in steganography [11] . These four families are the no-modification/synthesis SWE [15] , the probability map generation ASDL-GAN [16] , the adversarial ADV-EMB [17] , and finally, the 3 player game. In this paper, we only focus on the 3 player approach. This approach requires the use of 3 CNNs and is indeed different from the way the other families treat the problem. We will thus not compare our approach to the other families who are emerging. The philosophy of this paper is to clarify the 3 player game concept and propose practical solutions.
In this paper, section II is focused on the steganography's main concept with 3 player game. In section III, we recall the propositions given in [1] and [2] . In section IV we present three architectures in order to resolve previous unsolved problems. In section V we give some experimental results and the discussion of these results. Finally, we conclude in section VI.
II. 3 PLAYER GAME CONCEPT Notations: Lowercase letters in bold are for vectors and matrices, lowercase letters in italic represent scalars. "×" is used to separate the dimensions of multi-dimensional vectors and "·" represents a multiplication.
Let x ∈ {0, ..., 255} w×h be a cover matrix composed of w×h pixels, and y ∈ {0, ..., 255} w×h be a stego matrix with a size of w×h pixels generated by Agent-Alice. Let us further note m a secret binary message vector of m bits that AgentAlice wants to send to Agent-Bob, and m' the binary message extracted by Agent-Bob, where m' has the same length as m. Let k be the shared key between Agent-Alice and AgentBob, where k is a k-sized binary vector. We note z ∈ {0, ..., 255} w×h an image with an unknown label. We use the notation l for the image label where l ∈ {0,1}, l=0 if z is a cover, and l =1 if z is a stego.
A. General concept
This part of the paper introduces the general concept of the 3 player game and describes the role of each agent.
From Fig. 1 , we can see that the steganographic system based on the 3 player game approach is composed of three neural networks. These networks represent the three agents: Agent-Alice, Agent-Bob, and Agent-Eve.
The system takes as input a cover image x, a secret message m and a key k. These inputs are first introduced to AgentAlice's network that generates a non-discrete-stegoỹ∈ R w×h . Then the discretization module receivesỹ and generates y a stego image with discrete values. y is then given to both AgentBob and Agent-Eve.
Agent-Bob tries to recover the secret message m from the stego y using the shared secret key k. Agent-Bob inputs (y, and k) go through a set of layers and mathematical operations; the extracted message m' is then generated.
Agent-Eve receives an image z, and returns a probability score of z's membership to the cover or stego classes.
B. Three agent's losses
The objective of the steganographic system shown in Fig. 1 and described above is to learn a model so Agent-Alice can generate a stego y by embedding the secret message m within the cover x, and then secretly communicate it to Agent-Bob. Given this objective a loss function is given to each agent:
Agent-Eve's loss: Let an image z =(z ij ) w×h whose label l is unknown to Agent-Eve. Agent-Eve is modelled by a function Agent-Eve: z → [0, 1], which takes the image z and returns a real score between 0 and 1, such that 0 corresponds to a cover and 1 corresponds to a stego.
Agent-Eve's general loss consists in minimizing the distance between the label l and Agent-Eve's prediction:
The distance used for Agent-Eve's loss is usually the crossentropy distance; thus the loss of Eq. 1 is given as:
Agent-Bob's loss: Agent-Bob attempts to reconstruct the secret message m from the received image y using the key k. The reconstructed message m' should be equal to m (m = m'). To this end, the loss over Agent-Bob consists in minimizing a distance between m' and m (usually a L2 distance):
Agent-Alice's loss: Agent-Alice objectives are multiple. The first is to generate a stego image y that is close enough to the cover x. The second is to allow Agent-Bob to reconstruct the secret message m correctly from the stego image. And the third, is that it only allows Agent-Eve to randomly guess (output should be 1/2) whether a given image z is a cover or stego. The loss of Agent-Alice is then the weighted sum of three terms: L bob , L Eve , and dist(x,y) the distance calculated between x and y, where all coefficients λ A , λ B , λ E belongs to [0,1] and sum to one in order to adjust the contribution of each term to the loss of Agent-Alice:
Note that pixels values from x and y are all normalized by a division by 255. Each of the three terms has thus similar values ranges, which is a practical requirement in an optimization process (see Fig. 8 ).
C. Training process
Now that we have presented the general concept of the 3 player game and the loss of each agent, we present the algorithm used for the training process. As shown in Algorithm 1 in line 1, the global system is trained at the maximum for max-iter "loop". In each loop, the learning is done sequentially by first, the team Agent-Bob and Agent-Alice (line 2) and then, the Agent-Eve (line 8).
Note that there is a high number of loop in order to reach an equilibrium. Also, note that inside a loop there is also a certain number of backpropagation iterations for each agent.
Thus, for the learning of Agent-Bob and Agent-Alice (lines 2 to 7), there are it1 iterations (line 2). For an iteration, we load a mini-batch of cover images, secret messages, and keys (line 3), we forward propagates all the cover images on Agent-Bob and Agent-Alice networks (line 4), and then we update Agent-Bob and Agent-Alice by minimizing the L Bob and L Alice thanks to the stochastic gradient descent (lines 5 and 6). During this learning, the weights of Agent-Eve are fixed.
The learning of Agent-Eve (lines 8 to 12) is similar to the learning for Agent-Bob and Agent-Alice. There is it2 iterations (line 8). For an iteration, we load a mini-batch of cover images and stego images (line 9), we forward propagates all the cover and stego images on Agent-Eve network (line 10), and then we update Agent-Eve by minimizing the L Eve thanks to the stochastic gradient descent (lines 11).
Since equilibrium is reached, the last agent playing the game will not change its strategy. Thus, the fact to be the last player i.e. the last learning agent, will not impact the performance of the other agents.
III. RELATED WORK
In this subsection, we recall the architectures of GSIVAT [1] and HiDDen [2] . These two architectures were proposed basically for steganography purposes. They belong to the 3 player game family.
A. Generating Steganographic Images Via Adversarial Training (GSIVAT)
In [1] , the authors propose a steganographic system (GSI-VAT) composed of three neural networks, each one representing one agent (Agent-Alice, Agent-Bob, Agent-Eve). We sum up the GSIVAT architecture in Fig. 2 .
Their system takes as input: a cover image x, a 3D vector, whose size is w×h×c where c is the channel number and a secret message m of m bits. x is flattened to a 1D vector and concatenated with m, the resulting vector size is w·h·c+m. This vector is then fed to Agent-Alice.
Agent-Alice: Agent-Alice is composed of one fully connected layer (FC) and four deConv-BN-Act blocks (see Fig. 2 ). Each block is the combination of a deconvolution, a batch normalization and one activation function layer (ReLU, leakyReLU, sigmoid, tanh).
The number of neurons in the fully connected (FC) layer is the multiplication result of w·8·4·4. The output of the FC is reshaped to w·8 of 4×4 sized features-maps. Then, these feature-maps fed four deConv-BN-Act blocks. After each block, the size of these features-maps is up-sampled with a factor of two, and the channel number is reduced by a factor of two. In the end, an image of the same size as x is obtained. Agent-Alice outputs the stego imageỹ∈ R w×h which is fed to both Agent-Bob and Agent-Eve. The distance between x andỹ (dist(x,y) in Eq. 4) is the L2 distance.
Agent-Bob: Agent-Bob architecture is depicted in Fig. 2 . It consists of four Conv-BN-Act blocks and one FC layer. Each block is made of a fractionally-strided (stride=2) convolution layer, a batch normalization layer and an activation function "Leaky ReLU" [18] . The FC layer is made of m neurons followed by a tanh activation function.
Agent-Bob outputs the extracted message m'. The L2 distance is used to compute the loss previously given in Eq. 3.
Agent-Eve: It takes as input image z, and outputs a score determining the label of the input (cover/stego). The architectures of Agent-Eve and Agent-Bob are similar except for the fully connected layer having only two neurons, and the activation function replaced by a sigmoid. The sigmoid cross entropy loss is used for Eve's loss (see Eq. 2).
B. HiDDeN: Hiding Data With Deep Network
In [2] , the authors propose a model for image steganography, but also for watermarking (called HiDDen). We will only discuss the architecture of their steganographic system. Their system takes as input a w×h×c-sized cover image x and a m-length secret message m. The system is composed of three neural networks as illustrated in Fig. 3 . This network structure is generally composed of blocks called Conv-BNReLU which stands for the combination of Convolution, Batch Normalization and ReLU activation function.
Agent-Alice: Agent-Alice is composed of five Conv-BNReLU blocks and one convolution layer with a kernel size of 1×1. Firstly, the cover image x goes through four Conv-BNReLU blocks to obtain an intermediate representation imagẽ x. On the other hand, the message m is replicated so that the resulting size is w×h×m. Secondly,x is concatenated with the replicated message and fed to another Conv-BN-ReLU block with 64 output filters. A final convolution layer with a 1×1 kernel is used to generate the stego imageỹ∈ R w×h . The loss of Agent-Alice is calculated using the loss of Eq. 4.
Agent-Bob: Agent-Bob is composed of seven Conv-BNReLU blocks, followed by global spatial average pooling (to produce a vector with the same size as the message). Then, a single fully connected layer ends the architecture, as shown in Fig. 3 . Agent-Bob receives the stego imageỹ, and produces the predicted message m'. The distance used in Agent-Bob's loss of Eq. 3 is the l2 distance.
Agent-Eve: Agent-Eve takes an image as input, and outputs a score indicating whether the given image is a cover or stego one. Agent-Eve has an architecture similar to Agent-Bob, but it only has three Conv-BN-ReLU blocks instead of seven. The last layer is a FC layer with an output size of two units (see Fig. 3 ). The authors adopt the use of the cross-entropy loss presented in Eq. 2 for Agent-Eve.
C. Discussion
The two papers presented previously [1] [2] offer some interesting ideas, but there are flaws in both.
Firstly, neither of the two approaches use a shared secret key during the embedding/extracting process. The authors of [1] and [2] suppose that the information about model weights, architecture, and the set of images used for training is shared between Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob. According to the authors, this shared information can be considered as the secret key. Besides the fact that such a hypothesis is heavy in size (almost 70 Mb needs to be sent to Agent-Bob [1] ), it is also the equivalent of performing an embedding process with the same secret-key. Such embedding process is highly not recommended in steganography as it leads to a very strong detectability [19] .
Secondly, there is no discretization module for the generated images (Agent-Alice providesỹ instead of y). In a real-world situation [4] , Bob receives an image whose values are defined in {1,..., 255}, and has to extract the secret message. In [1] and [2] , Agent-Alice generates real-valued images i.e. not discretevalues images, and these images are fed to Agent-Bob. This makes both Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob useless in practice. Alice needs to send to Bob images that are not suspicious, and thus needs to send images with discrete values in order to format them in pgm, or any lossless compressed images format. Note that if Alice decides to round the real-values images (generated by the Agent-Alice) in order to discretize them in {1,..., 255}, Bob, when using Agent-Bob algorithm, will not extract correctly the message since Agent-Bob has been built for real-values images 2 . Thirdly, the computation load is a serious issue that we need to take into account when working with deep learning. GSIVAT authors [1] have worked on 32×32-sized images while Hidden authors [2] have used 16×16-sized patches. This limitation for the sizes of the images is due to the use of the FC layers which induce expensive memory and computation costs. The authors justify that working on large images could be completed by treating bigger images with a separate treatment for each part of the image. This is indeed a bad idea since statistical traces may be found at the block boundaries and would lead to an easily detectable embedding scheme (See for example the discussion in section 4.2 of [20] , or the dependencies preservation between blocks in JPEG steganography [21] ).
Finally, note that in these two papers the experimental steganalysis is performed with the algorithm ATS [22] proposed in 2015. This algorithm is basically proposed to handle the cover-source mismatch problem, which is definitely not the appropriate scenario to evaluate the empirical security of an embedding algorithm, especially when it is a strategic embedding algorithm. Indeed ATS relies on the hypothesis of constant noise direction in the embedding space which may not be true for a strategic adaptive algorithms. The empirical security is probably undervalued when compared to 2 We observed this phenomenon during our experiments.
an RM+EC [23] , [24] , Yedroudj-Net [25] , ReST-Net [26] , or SRNet [27] . Moreover, these steganalysis algorithms such as Ensemble Classifier/Rich Model (EC + RM) [23] , [24] , Yedroudj-Net [25] , ReST-Net [26] , or SRNet [27] represent state-of-the-art steganalysis, and thus, using these modern algorithms makes more sense.
IV. OUR STEGANOGRAPHIC SYSTEM'S ARCHITECTURE
In this paper, we propose a new strategic adaptive steganography system based on the 3 player game concept. We are obtaining an embedding algorithm (Agent-Alice) and an extracting algorithm (Agent-Bob) functional in practice. We therefore:
1) Integrate a stego-key for the input of Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob. With two different stego-keys, Agent-Alice will generate two different stego images. Alice knows that she must change its stego-key very often if she does not want to be caught [19] . By extension, knowing that it is easier to break a system that always uses the same keys, it is important to integrate a stego key in the input of Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob in order to avoid the counter-productivity that a unique key could have on the convergence of Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob facing the Agent-Eve. This argument is not at all considered in [1] and [2] and can be a strong break to their performances. 2) handles the problem of discretization in order for Alice to be able to send to Bob, through e-mail, memory stick, cloud storage, an image in a non-suspicious standard format ( [1] and [2] does not deals with this fundamental issue), 3) guarantees a scalable (in memory and in computation) solution thanks to an architecture that consists of only convolutions, and thus that can deals with image dimension usually used in deep-learning and steganalysis by deep-learning in the academic experiments (255 × 255 or 512 × 512) [11] . The convolutional architectures also allow deeper architecture allowing to model harder problems. GSIVAT [1] works with 32 × 32 images and HiDDeN [2] works with 16 × 16 images and they both use very small networks. Additionally, our approach offers two interesting properties. First, it is "bit-rate adaptive". Indeed, there is no need to retrain the system each time we change the bit rate, i.e. each time the message size is different (this is not the case for [1] and [2] ). Secondly, we adopt a strong steganalyst for AgentEve, which at the most ensures better security, and at less is an up-to-date steganalysis.
We propose three different architectures for our steganographic system. These architectures illustrate three different solutions going from the basic one to the more adapted solution. On these three architectures, Agent-Eve's architecture remains the same, while Agent-Alice's and Agent-Bob's architecture change their designs. The first architecture is presented to illustrate the use of a secret shared key during the embedding. The second architecture intends to reduce the power of noise introduced by embedding the hidden message into the cover image. Finally, the third architecture tries to improve the performances of message extraction while linking Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob's behaviour.
A. The training process
Over the three proposed architecture, the training procedure of the system remains the same. We alternate the training between the three agents Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob and AgentEve, where Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob are jointly trained as a single network, and Agent-Eve is trained separately.
First, Agent-Bob and Agent-Alice are trained on a fixed number of mini-batch, then, a checkpoint of their models is saved, and their evolution is paused. Next, we switch the training to Agent-Eve's network using the two models of AgentAlice and Agent-Bob saved previously. See Algorithm. 1
This training process is repeated for several loop until all losses tend to be constant.
B. The proposed architecture of the Agent-Eve
Agent-Eve tries to guide both Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob through the process of learning a strategic adaptive embedding algorithm. If Agent-Eve is weak, the 3-agent system falls down because Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob will no longer be searching for better solutions as Agent-Eve cannot cope with their evolution. To this end, it is essential to adopt a strong steganalyzer.
In 2018, the best spatial steganalyst was, YedroudjNet [25] [28] (first published in January 2018), ResT-Net [26] (published in March 2018) and very recently SRNet [27] (published in September 2018). Among these networks, YedroudjNet is the shallowest network with six convolution layers compared to 25 layers for SRNet, and 30 layers for ReSTNet (3 sub-networks each containing 10 layers). Beside its affordable size, Yedroudj-Net training does not require the use of any tricks that could increase the computational time. This network is therefore well adapted to Agent-Eve, especially knowing that the 3 players approach takes a lot of time before it converges to a good solution. Additionally, Yedroudj-Net can easily be improved in the future if required [29] .
Yedroudj-Net architecture [25] is presented in Fig. 4 . It is composed of 7 blocks: a pre-processing block, five convolutional blocks, and a fully connected block made of three fully connected layers followed by a softmax 3 . Agent-Eve's network (Yeroudj-Net) is trained by minimizing the loss given in Eq. 2.
C. First-Architecture
The first architecture is similar in spirit to the previous approaches of existing literature except that it contains only convolutional layers, and integrates a stego-key.
Agent-Alice's network receives a secret message m of a length m, a key k of k bits, and a cover x. To be able to convolute the cover x with the message m, both should have the same size. We therefore use the key k to spread out the secret message m in a matrix noted as s (m) ∈{0, 1} w×h that is filled with zeros and has the same size of our cover image. The spreading of m in s (m) is obtained by using a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) seeded by the key k. The PRNG sequentially pick a bit of m and fills a non-used position in the s (m) matrix. The filled positions define the binary mask Ω∈{0, 1}
w×h . Ω thus contains exactly m ones. Note that with the knowledge of k, and the index of a bit m i in our message m with i∈{1, ..., m}, we can deduce the position (u, v)∈{0, ..w} × {0, ..h} where this bit is stored in s (m) , and inversely from a position (u, v)∈{0, ..w} × {0, ..h}, we can deduce the bit m i with i∈{1, ..., m} of the message m.
The cover image x is fed to a convolution layer called SRM-F. Its weights are initialized with the 30-basic high-pass filters of SRM [24] , similarly to Yedroudj-Net [25] . The output is then concatenated with s (m) and fed to conv Stack0 which is composed of a set of convolution layers. The output is a w × h image which represents the stego image y (see Fig. 5 ). Agent-Bob uses the stego y and the key k to output the predicted message m', a vector of m bits. First, the stego image passes through a convolution layer similar to SRM-F. Next, the obtained feature-maps from SRM-F goes through another set of convolutions in two conv Stack1, conv Stack2 (Note that conv Stack2 share the same construction with conv Stack0, but not the same number of features-maps for each layer) . The extracted message m' is then obtained (see Fig. 5 ).
The backpropagation is done by minimising both losses of Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob's. For Agent-Bob's loss (see Eq. 3), we use the Mean Square Error (MSE) distance, it is calculated between m and m' and written as:
which is equivalent to:
with the point-wise operation. Agent-Alice uses the loss presented in Eq. 4 with dist(x,y) calculated as:
and thus Agent-Alice's loss is:
, where λ A , λ B , λ E ∈ belongs to [0,1] and sum to one in order to adjust the contribution of each term to the loss.
In this architecture, the magnitude of modifications is not restricted and therefore the stego noise power is too strong. To impose stego noise power restriction, we propose a second architecture.
D. Second-Architecture (noise power reduction)
The second architecture improves the first one by imposing a stronger restriction on the magnitude of modification of the stego noise. We force Agent-Alice to make the least changes to the cover while Agent-Bob is still able to retrieve the secret message correctly. Within this architecture, see Fig. 6 , AgentBob's design remains the same as in the previous architecture. However, the architecture of Agent-Alice has changed. Instead of letting the network decide the intensity of modification for each pixel in the cover image, it is restricted to a ternary modification; thus the stego noise values are {-1, 0, 1}. More precisely, during the first iterations, values are reals in the range [−1, 1] but at the end of iterations, a discretization is done in order to have only three discrete values {-1, 0, 1}.
Said differently, Agent-Alice generates a modification map n∈{-1, 0, 1} which is then added to the cover image x to generate the stego y directly (see Fig. 6 ). The generation of n is performed thanks to the resulting feature maps of SRM-F, and the spread message s (m) . These are both concatenated and fed to conv Stack3; the output of the latter is n in the range [−1, 1] thanks to a TanH activation function, and is one of the three discrete values {-1, 0, 1} once the discretization is activate.
Agent-Bob's network loss remains the same as in Eq. 5. For Agent-Alice's loss, we calculate the mean of the absolute values of the modification maps n (which is equivalent to the MSE) for the distance between the cover image x and the stego y.
One can notice that minimizing the loss using this distance forces Agent-Alice to output only zeros over the map of modifications. Agent-Bob is then no longer capable of retrieving the secret message. To reduce this constraint, we introduce a constant β in Agent-Alice's loss. This β value is related to the change rate notion. The loss thus becomes:
where λ A , λ B , λ E ∈[0, 1]. Note that β controls the discretion of the embedding network, i.e how many pixels Agent-Alice is allowed to alter from the cover image x.
E. Third-Architecture (source separation)
The architecture shown in Fig. 7 is proposed as an improvement to the second architecture. The embedding part of the second architecture was changed to make as few changes as possible. The extracting part, on the other hand, was kept as it is from the first architecture. Nevertheless, constraining the amplitude of modifications directly impacts the extracting part. When we limit the number of pixels that can be modified, more errors occur during message extraction. In other words, altering fewer pixels means less detectability, but more errors during message-extraction, while changing more pixels means fewer errors when retrieving the message, but more detectability. How can Agent-Bob extract the secret message correctly when Agent-Alice carries out the minimal required modification?
In embedding algorithms such as S-UNIWARD [6] , WOW [7] , etc, the message coding requires, in practice, the use of a Syndrome-Trellis-Codes STC [30] . The extractor (Bob) has access to the parity-check matrix h∈{0, 1} w×h used by Alice during the embedding process. This matrix h is then shared between Alice and Bob, so Bob can easily retrieve the message from y by calculating the matrix product as: m= h · lsb(y), with lsb (.) the function extracting the LSB plane. In our proposed method, no parity-check matrix is shared between Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob, nor any related information. If Agent-Bob has to mimic an STC to perform the message extraction in the 3 player game, it should learn a matrix in conjunction with Agent-Alice in order to retrieve the message correctly. Without any topological or mathematical construction, this can be difficult especially when the system used has many loss terms to minimize (Nash equilibrium issue).
A solution for that problem could be to inject a coding/decoding block inside Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob. Nevertheless, this is not an easy task, and before trying this solution, we prefer explored the impact of increasing the link between the two agents. The integration of a coding and decoding block is postponed for future work.
So we still go in the direction of more link between the Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob, and this by forcing their topology to be more anti-symmetric. Referring to Fig. 7 , we dawned two blue rectangles to show where this anti-symmetry has been injected. On one of the rectangle, we noted on the figure, g, the point-wise summation block, and g', the sources separation block. g and g' can be seen as inverse functions such that:
For a given cover, x, and a stego noise, n, g ((g(n, x)) gives an estimated cover, x', and a estimated stego noise, n'. During the learning, we then minimize the distance between x and x' (which is equivalent to minimize the distance between n and n'); See Eq. 10.
The sources separation block act as a denoiser. The wellknown U-Net [31] as thus been used and integrate into AgentBob's architecture (see Fig. 7 ). The goal of the U-Net is to reconstruct the cover image x from the stego y image. The modification map n is resulting from the subtraction of the reconstructed cover x' from the stego image y.
Referring to Fig. 7 , on the other rectangle, we noted on the figure, f, the conv Stack3 block, and f', the conv Stack1 blocks. f and f' can be seen has inverse function from the point view of the spreaded message s (m) and the modification map n :
with r and r' the 30 residual images obtained by SRM-F filtering.
For a given spreaded message s (m) , and residual images r and r', f r ((f r (s (m) )) gives an estimated spreaded message s (m ) . During the learning, we then minimize the distance between m and m' (which is equivalent to minimize the distance between s (m) and s (m ) ; see Eq. 6); See Eq. 11. Note that conv Stack1 and conv Stack3 are the same than in the second architecture.
Agent-Bob's loss is thus composed of two loss terms:
• the cover reconstruction loss:
• the message extraction loss:
The Agent-Bob loss is thus given by:
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset and software platform
In this paper, the experiments are carried out on two image sources. The first is the well-known database BOSSBase 1.01 [32] which contains 10,000 8-bit grayscale images, size 512×512 pixels. This database was created for steganalysis purposes in 2011. Images of this database offer different texture characteristics, which explains why it is widely used in steganalysis. BOWS2 [33] is our second database. It was created for a watermarking contest and consists of 10,000 8-bit grayscale images, size 512×512 pixels. Due to our GPU computing platform, time limitation and the 3 player game nature, which takes a lot of time to train due to the two-phase learning. We conduct all the experiments on images of 256×256 pixels. To this end, we resampled all images from the two databases from 512×512 pixels to 256×256 pixels, using the imresize() Matlab function with default parameters. We implemented the proposed architectures presented in section IV using TensorFlow V 1.6. As for comparison, we use S-UNIWARD [6] , and WOW [7] , two well-known contentadaptive methods for spatial domain embedding. All our experiments were conducted on NVIDIA Titan X GPU platform 4 .
B. Training, Validation, Test
We start the training phase by preparing a pre-trained model of Agent-Eve. For this, we use the S-Uniward algorithm to generate 10,000 stegos from the BOSSBase. 10,000 cover/stego pairs are then obtained. We use 4,000 pairs to train a Yedroudj-Net network. After several epochs of training we obtain a learned model of Yedroudj-Net, which we transfer to Agent-Eve; thus Agent-Eve does not learn from scratch.
Once Agent-Eve is pre-trained we start the learning phase of the 3-players (Agent-Alice, Agent-Bob and Agent-Eve). We use BOSSBase as the image source. The messages are generated using a PRNG 5 with a chosen payload. We use Adam, an adaptive optimizer to train our system of three networks where the mini-batch size is set to 4. The values of λ A , λ B , λ E are set to 0.2, 0.4, and 0,4 respectively. These values are chosen empirically. They thus may not be optimum.
During training, we set the maximum number of iterations max-iter to 1 million iterations. The training is alternated between Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob from one side, and Agent-Eve from another side. We set it1 to 50 iterations, and it2 to 1 iteration (see Algorithm.1, so Agent-Alice and AgentBob are trained for 50 iterations, compared to 1 iteration for Agent-Eve).
When the losses of the three networks tend to be stable we freeze their training and we integrate the discretization module into Agent-Alice (see Fig. 1 ). Then, we resume the training for several iterations (more or less 50,000 iterations), so the system learns how to generate stego images with discrete pixel values.
We should note that activating the discretization module at the beginning of the training phase prevents the system from converging (as the round function is not differentiable). We therefore let the system converge towards a solution, then we force it to work on images with discrete pixel values. Once our system is well trained (losses curves are stable as shown in Fig. 8) , we stop the training phase.
To evaluate the performance of our method, we measure the security and the transmission error. The security is measured with the probability of error (Pe) of a given steganalyzer, where Pe is computed as the average of the false alarm rate and the missed detection rate. For the transmission error, we use the Bit Error Rate (BER). This represents the number of bits that Bob can retrieve without error. Note that the BER should not be used in a standard steganographic scenario since no channel error should be considered during the transmission of the stego image. Unfortunately, none of the architecture of existing literature for the 3 player game are able to embed a message that could be retrieved without errors. In practical use, one should consider a preliminary coding of the message by a correcting code in order to ensure a correct extraction from Bob's side. We will not integrate such a coding but will discuss it. Indeed, this paper is primarily on the 3 player concept definition and the proposition of three architectures.
Therefore for the testing phase, Agent-Alice starts generating 10,000 Stego images from BOWS2, where a random message is embedded in a cover image using a random key. The generated images are used to evaluate the accuracy of Bob's message retrieval on the one hand and the security of our steganographic system against the steganalyzer Yedroudj-Net on the other. Please note that the steganalysis with YedroudjNet (learning and testing) is done on BOWS2Base, as for the training of the 3-players (Agent-Alice, Agent-Bob, and AgentEve) it is carried out using the different and disjointed BOSSBase. The results are presented in the following subsection.
C. Results of the three architectures 1) Extraction and security comparison:
First architecture:
In Table I , we report the Bit Error Rate (BER) and the Probability of error (Pe) obtained using the first architecture. These tests are carried on BOWS2 database at different payloads 0.2 bpp, 0.4 bpp and 1 bpp. The used steganalyzer is Yedroudj-Net. Regardless of the payload, Bob who uses the Agent-Bob can correctly recover the secret message with a BER equal to zero. We can observe that this architecture is not at all secure since the detection accuracy obtained using Yedroudj-Net is between 96% and almost 98%.
The first architecture offers a good embedding capacity, where we can perfectly recover the secret message even when the payload is significant, although the low security given by this architecture does not make it interesting for steganography purposes.
Note that this architecture is the closest form of architecture to GSIVAT or HiDDeN since the main principle is to spread the message in the spirit of a spread spectrum watermarking approach. This first architecture, GSIVAT, and HiDDeN are definitively unsecure approaches since the stego noise power is too strong. We investigated in the second architecture a way to constrain pixels modifications to -1 or +1. Second architecture: In the second architecture, we manage to control the noise power introduced by Agent-Alice during the embedding process. For this purpose, we have conducted several experiments with different values of the change rate β of the Eq. 9. In Fig. 9 , we present the Bit Error Rate (BER) and the Probability of error (Pe) of the second architecture, when different β values are used, for a fixed payload of 0.4 bpp. The used steganalyzer is Yedroudj-Net. We can see that, for β equal to 0.4, Eve, the steganalyzer (Yedroudj-net) gets an Probability of error (Pe) close to 6% when Bob makes 5% of Bit Error Rate (BER). When β is set to 0.2, the security of our system improves with a Pe equal to 9%, although the message extraction becomes more difficult for Bob with 12% of Bit Error Rate.
For a β value equal to or less than 0.05, the generated images are more secure. Nevertheless, the BER increases considerably. The BER is 32% and 40%, and the Pe is 15% and 30% for β equals 0,05 and 0 respectively. Those BER values are very high and would be difficult to correct with a correcting code without strongly reducing to the real payload size. The best β value is those that in the same time, maximize the detection error value (Pe), and minimize the size of the coded message; the message has thus to be encoded such that a correct extraction is ensured. Since those considerations are a little bit out of topic, we propose a rapid analysis by choosing a particular point which is where there is a sudden variation of BER i.e. the inflection point. For this architecture and for a payload size 0.4 bpp, the value of β where there is a sudden variation of BER is around β = 0.1. At β = 0.1, the BER=12%. Using the [7, 4, 3] Hamming Error Correcting Code (ECC), ensure to correct at most 14% BER so would in average correct all the errors. With this ECC the real payload size is thus 0.23 bpp, and we measure for that point a probability of Error of 10.2%. It is clear that this architecture gives better results compared to the first one, where for a payload of 0.2 bpp the Pe is 3%. Nevertheless, those results are still not convincing, and as explained before, the problem of the second architecture is the weak relationship between Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob. The third architecture aims at providing a solution to this weakness. In Fig. 10 we can observe that this architecture can learn to concentrate the embedding on textual regions, which are more difficult for a steganalyzer to detect. This architecture has the capacity to learn and find interesting zones to implement steganography.
Third architecture: As mentioned above, the third architecture has been proposed to improve the extraction part of the second architecture. However, this requires more time to converge, but the bright side is that it offers a better message retrieval accuracy. In Fig. 11 , we present the bit error rate (BER) and the Probability of error (Pe) of the third architecture as a function of β the change rate, for a fixed payload 0.4 bpp.
Compared to the second architecture, the error of Bob (BER) is smaller regardless of the value of β, even though the detection accuracy remains almost the same for both architectures. The BER obtained with the third architecture and compared to the second architecture is 2% lower when β is 0.4, 6% lower when we set β to 0.2, and 5% lower when the β is set to 0.1. By observing these results, we see that AgentAlice and Agent-Bob have nevertheless benefited from the third architecture. More joint learning between Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob seems to be the right research direction.
Looking at Fig. 11 , similarly to the second architecture, the inflection point is around β = 0.1. Taking this point, the BER is 0.06. The errors can be corrected with a Hamming code [15, 11, 3] . In this case the real payload size is (0, 4 · 11)/15 = 0.293bpp ≈ 0.3 bpp. Using this payload we obtain a Pe of around 11%.
To give a comparison, we run a steganalysis with YedroudjNet against two steganographic algorithms S-UNIWARD and WOW at a payload size of 0.3 bpp using the database BOWS2. The Probability of error (Pe) are 27.3% and 22.4% for S-UNIWARD and WOW respectively. There is undoubtedly a security gap with the actual embedding schemes, but again, the objective of the paper is to define the 3 player game concept, and to analysis, its potential compare to modern embedding scheme and steganalysis scheme. In that, the third architecture shows that there is a real potential, and this paper paves the way to many research. Fig. 12 shows the modifications zone using the third architecture. We can observe some adaptivity, as the embedding is more dense in textured zones. The results show that this architecture can implement adaptive embedding. It also indicates that the link between AgentAlice and Agent-Bob should be reinforced in the future to reduce the BER and eventually reduce the change rate and increase the security level. These results should not deter from the 3-player concepts, even if the security level at the moment is lower compared to the traditional adaptive embedding algorithms such as S-UNIWARD, WOW, etc. Indeed the paper shows a real improvement compared to GSIVAT and HiDDEeN and paves the way for a new direction in research.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have first recalled the four different GAN families used in steganography. Then we presented the 3 player game approach, and defined the general concept and how to correctly use it for steganography. Three architectures based on the 3 player game approach have been proposed. The first architecture came to fix the flaws made in GSIVAT and HiDDEeN. Nevertheless, this first architecture behaves similarly to GSIVAT and HiDDEeN and is not adapted for steganography purposes due to its extreme detectability. With the second architecture, we suggested a new way to embed a message in the cover image. Instead of directly modifying the cover image, which implies a significant noise power signal, we proposed to generate a modification map with values belonging to {-1,0,1}. The stego is then generated by adding the modification map to the cover. This architecture is much more secure than the first one, but it generates more errors at message extraction. Finally, the third architecture impose a more joint learning between Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob in order to reduce the errors during the message extraction. This third architecture takes much more time to converge but achieves better results.
The third architecture, with a real payload size of 0,3 bpp, can perfectly retrieve an embedded message (with the help of error correcting code), for a security level Pe = 10,8%. Even if the obtained results do not surpass current state-of-theart embedding algorithms, those experimental results verify the promises of such a method. The major contribution of this paper is thus to propose a formalization of the 3 player game concept, and a end-to-end method using neural networks that can learn to simulate algorithms using human-based rules (steganography and steganalysis).
We expect this work to lead to fruitful avenues for further research. In future work, we can study the possibility of making Agent-Alice and Agent-Bob synchronize more, and thus improving the general performances. We can also try using a more subtle loss function. This can help the networks to converge to a better solution. Furthermore, finding a theoretical way to compute the change rate β can help to accelerate the learning process. The values of λ A , λ B , λ E could also be more extensively studied.
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